Abstract. Kallahalla et al. presented a RSA-based Forward Key Rotation mechanism in secure storage scheme PLUTUS to ensure that the key used for encrypting updated files is related to the keys for all files in the file group. The encryption scheme based on Forward Key Rotation is such a scheme that only the authorized person is allowed access to the designated files and the previous versions. In this paper, we present a Forward Key Rotation storage scheme based on discrete logarithm and discuss its security. Moreover, we propose another improved Forward Key storage scheme from pairing on elliptic curves. Compared to the scheme presented by Kallahalla et al., our scheme uses relatively short keys to provide equivalent security. In addition, the re-generated keys can be verified to ensure that the keys are valid in the improved scheme.
Introduction
As more information becomes available in digital format, enormous quantities of data are created. With the increasing requirement to both temporarily and permanently retain information, the secure storage technique is attracting much attention. In a data storage system, the storage medium for preserving the information is an important target to a malicious attacker. Once the attacker breaks the system, he can gain unauthorized information, disclose some valuable secrets or prevent the access of legitimate users. In order to avoid these risks, the researchers have proposed many potential systems for securing stored information, such as NASD [2] [3], PASIS [4] [5], CFS [6] , SNAD [7] [8] and PLUTUS [1] , and so on. Moreover, all these researches come into being a field of computer research. Currently, the major target of a secure storage system is ensuring information confidentiality, integrity and availability without substantially degrading performance.
Kallahalla et al. [1] present a secure storage scheme, PLUTUS, in 2003. The primary goal of the scheme is to provide file owners with direct control over authorizing access to their files as well as scalable key management. Key revocation is a major problem in secure storage system. Due to the proliferation of keys and the use of file groups, the key revocation is very complicated. Since several files in the file system are encrypted with the same key, key revocation will result in mass re-encryption. However, Kallahalla et al designed a key rotation scheme to alleviate the negative effects. The key rotation scheme can make the updated secret key relate to the previous versions. For the user of PLUTUS, when he is allowed access to a certain re-encrypted files using given file-group key, then he can generate previous versions from the given key. In other words, any valid user can re-generate the matching key for a given file if he has the latest file-group key. Therefore, we call the key rotate scheme designed by Kallahalla Forward Key Rotate (FKR) scheme.
The security of the FKR presented by Kallahalla et al. is based on the RSA. However, limited by the prime generation technique, producing a pair of suitable keys used in RSA scheme is not an easy thing. Moreover, until now there is no way to show the strength of the RSA is equivalent to that of decomposing a large number. Currently, RSA based schemes use relatively long keys compared to the security they provide. In this aspect, a scheme based on elliptic curves provides much shorter keys. As the requirement of practice, it is necessary to design other KFR storage scheme related to different intractable problems.
In this paper, we first present a FKR storage scheme based on discrete logarithm and discuss its security. Subsequently, we present an improved FKR storage scheme from pairings on elliptic curves. Compared to the mechanism presented by Kallahalla et al., the improved scheme provides relatively short keys to perform the same function. Moreover, the user can verify the validity of the re-generated keys via bilinear pairings.
The paper is organized as follows. In section2, we will review Kallahalla et al.'s KFR scheme. Some complexity assumptions are presented in section 3. We propose our FKR storage scheme based on discrete logarithm in section 4. In section 5, we discuss the security of the proposed FKR storage scheme. Subsequently, we present an improved KFR storage scheme in section 6. Finally, we draw the conclusions in section 7.
Kallahalla et al.'s Forward key rotation scheme
Kallahalla et al. [1] proposed a Forward Key Rotation scheme used in PLUTUS system in 2003. In this section, we will briefly review their FKR scheme. Suppose that there exists a secure RSA encrypt scheme as defined in [13] . Let be a user who will establish a FKR scheme, be the public key of and be the matching private key. 
wants to access the FKR scheme, the user gives the latest key . Hence, has ability to compute and get any
k ≤ . The security of the scheme is based on RSA. Kallahalla et al. simplify the key management of PLUTUS using this FKR scheme.
Background

Complexity Assumptions
We assume that a prime is chosen at random such that ⎯
Bilinear Maps
Let be a cyclic multiplicative group generated by 1 G g , whose order is a prime and be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q . Assume that the discrete logarithm in both and is intractable. A bilinear pairing is a map e :
and satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinear:
2. Non-degenerate: There exists
3. Computable: For 1 , g p G ∈ , there is an efficient algorithm to compute .
( , ) e g p Typically, the map will be derived either from the modified Weil pairing [10] [11] or the Tate pairing [12] on an elliptic curve over a finite field. Pairings and other parameters should be selected in proactive for efficiency and security. In group , the CDH and K-E assumptions defined in 3.1 are intractable. However, the DDH assumption is tractable. 
General Scheme
A FKR storage scheme consists of four algorithms.
1. Initialize. Given the security parameter l , the algorithm outputs the system parameters. 
Key Generation ( i
Security Notions
We define adaptively chosen ciphertext security of a FKR storage scheme. Security is defined using the following game between an Attacker and Challenger.
1. Setup. The Challenger initializes the system. The Challenger gives the Attacker the resulting system parameters. 2. Query phase 1. The Attacker adaptively issues encrypt queries and decryption queries , respectively. The Challenger simulates Encrypt and Decrypt respectively, and responds with matching answers. 
Forward Key Rotation Storage Scheme
In this section, we will design a FKR storage scheme related to discrete logarithm. We suppose that Server who has a series of files 
Security
The security of the scheme is partly based on the algorithms ( 
where ED t is the time for performing an encryption or decryption algorithm. Proof. We assume that Eve is an attacker who has the ability to break the storage scheme. Then there exists a challenger Alice who can solve the DDH problem by running Eve as a subroutine. The system chooses a random bit and a random number . The challenger Alice is . If 1 b = , the system sets , otherwise, chooses a random
The attacker Eve is allowed to issue Encrypt, Decrypt and Challenge queries. The challenger Alice will simulate the corresponding oracles to output the answers.
Query Phase 1. The attacker Eve is allowed to issue following queries. Encrypt queries. Eve chooses a random number
, and takes any file is not permitted. We assume that Eve issues at most E q encrypt queries and D q decrypt queries.
Guess. After receiving the answer from Alice, Eve outputs his guess
Since Eve has ability to break the scheme with non-negligible probability ε , i.e. outputs ' λ λ = with probability ε , then the challenger Alice can solve DDH with the same probability.
□
Improved scalable FKR storage scheme
In section 4, we have presented a FKR storage scheme based on discrete logarithm. However, in practice some devices only have limited capability, so we should design a scheme which can provide shorter keys. Thereby, an improved FKR storage scheme from pairing on elliptic curve is presented in this section. In this scheme the re-generated keys can be verified via bilinear pairings. Thus also provide a measure for a user to verify the validity of the plaintext.
Let and be two groups that support a bilinear map as defined in section 3.2. There exists a pair of security algorithms , where the algorithm is a secure encryption algorithm based on elliptic curves, and is the matching decryption algorithm. Step2. Server generates the encrypted files 
Conclusions
Secure storage is a crucial problem in the Internet. Motivated by Kallahalla's forward key rotation and the requirement of the short key schemes, we present two FKR storage scheme. One is based on discrete logarithm, and another is from bilinear pairing on elliptic curve. The latter storage scheme is suitable for implementation in many scenarios, especially those where the storage capability of the users is limited.
